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Chief Judge Scott W. Stucky+ 
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
William Tecumseh Sherman was one of the greatest commanders of the 19th 
century.  His accomplishments in the Civil War are immortal, and he became 
Commanding General of the Army.  Less known is the fact that he briefly, and 
without much success, practiced law in, of all places, Leavenworth, Kansas.  
Sherman expressed himself vigorously on the subject of law and the armed 
forces.  I read this quote because it illustrates the accepted view of the subject 
for much of the nation’s history and helps to explain some of what I intend to 
cover in speaking of the development of appellate review of courts-martial: 
 [I]t will be a grave error if, by negligence, we permit the military 
law to become emasculated by allowing lawyers to inject into it 
principles derived from their practice in the civil courts, which belong 
to a totally different system of jurisprudence. 
 The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a 
community all the liberty, security and happiness possible, consistent 
with the safety of all.  The object of military law is to govern armies 
composed of strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest 
measure of force at the will of the nation. 
 These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each requires its 
own separate system of laws— statute and common.  ‘An army is a 
collection of armed men obliged to obey one man.’  Every enactment, 
every change of rule which impairs the principle weakens the army, 
impairs its value, and defeats the very object of its existence.  All the 
traditions of civil lawyers are antagonistic to this vital principle, and 
                                                 
 + President George W. Bush appointed Scott W. Stucky to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces on December 20, 2006. He became Chief Judge on August 1, 2017.  He graduated 
from Wichita State University, where he received a commission as a second lieutenant, U.S. Air 
Force Reserve, through ROTC.  He then attended Harvard Law School, from which he graduated 
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military men must meet them on the threshold of discussion, else 
armies will become demoralized by engrafting on our code their 
deductions from civil practice.1 
The military justice system is the oldest system of federal jurisprudence in the 
United States—older than the Constitution, older even than the nation.  Since 
we had an army before we had a nation, it was necessary to have a system for 
disciplining that army.  The revolutionaries shared the traditional English 
distrust for standing armies, which dates back to Cromwell and James II.  The 
Mutiny Act of 1689, which authorized discipline in the army and required annual 
parliamentary authorization for its existence, was Parliament’s reaction to those 
excesses after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.2 
The first American Articles of War were enacted by the Second Continental 
Congress in 1775.  The Constitution, in Article I, section 8, gave Congress the 
power “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces.”3  Congress reenacted Articles of War in 1806, 1874, 1916, and 1920.  
Articles for the Government of the Navy, separate from the Articles of War, 
were also enacted, first in 1799. 
The Constitution also provided, in Article III, that “The judicial Power of the 
United States” was to be lodged in “one supreme Court” and such inferior courts 
as Congress might establish and that these courts should be staffed by judges 
appointed during good behavior.4  So how did we end up with a separate system 
of military justice, staffed by judges who do not enjoy the Article III protections 
of life tenure and protection against salary reduction?  Remember what General 
Sherman said about the different objects of military and civil law; the Framers 
were fully aware of them at the beginning of the Republic. 
In fact, Congress has from the beginning lodged cases that would seem to be 
within the Article III judicial power in so-called “legislative courts,” established 
by Congress under other constitutional provisions than Article III.  While it is 
clear that Congress’ authority to do this is broad, the limits of the power are by 
no means clear, as we shall see.  The Supreme Court, in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.5—a less-than-successful 1982 
attempt to draw lines between matters that had to go to the Article III courts and 
those that did not—listed courts-martial as one of three traditional areas where 
Congress has used Article I courts.6 
Courts-martial have therefore been understood from the beginning to be 
different, and to warrant separate constitutional treatment from civil or criminal 
                                                 
 1. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, MILITARY LAW, 130 (W.C. & F.P. Church, 1880). 
 2. See Court-martial, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/court-martial-military-law; English Bill of Rights, HISTORY 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/english-bill-of-rights. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 5. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) 
 6. Id. at 71. 
2020] Appellate Review of Courts-Martial 799 
controversies in the Article III courts.  They stand on a different, but equally 
valid, constitutional foundation (Article I rather than Article III), and they have 
a purpose beyond doing justice and resolving controversies (viz., to ensure good 
order and discipline in the armed forces) which has no civilian analogue.  Their 
function also imports certain requirements (portability, speed, the use of lay 
personnel) which do not appear in the civil courts. 
The traditional understanding of the relations of courts-martial to the Article 
III courts was set out in Dynes v. Hoover7, where a sailor who had been convicted 
of attempted desertion by a naval court-martial brought an action of assault and 
battery and false imprisonment.8  The Court stated: 
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of 
military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by 
civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any 
connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining 
the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers 
are entirely independent of each other . . . . With the sentences of courts 
martial which have been convened regularly, and have proceeded 
legally, and by which punishments are directed, not forbidden by law 
. . . civil courts have nothing to do, nor are they in any way alterable 
by them.9 
In other words, if a court-martial was properly convened, had jurisdiction over 
the person and the offense, and followed whatever internal rules were prescribed 
to govern courts-martial, that ended the matter.  The Article III courts would go 
no further (and remember, this was collateral, not direct review.)  The accused 
had whatever rights Congress elected to give him, or the customs of the service 
required, and no more.  Remember, for instance, that flogging was not abolished 
in the Navy until 1850, and in the Army until 1861. 
Although the Civil War resulted in the mobilization of millions of men, there 
was no move to change the court-martial system until World War I.  We like to 
think of judicial review as one of those things which has always been around—
a view we probably get from the Langdellian method of teaching law through 
the close study of appellate opinions (itself a post-Civil War novelty.)  In fact, 
direct judicial review of courts-martial was unknown until after World War II.  
(For that matter, general judicial review of civilian federal criminal convictions 
did not begin until 1891, with the inception of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.) 
Until after World War I, there was no review of courts-martial under the 
Articles of War other than by the convening authority, except in a very few cases 
involving the death penalty, dismissal of an officer, or general officers.  The 
President was required to confirm death sentences (with certain wartime 
                                                 
 7. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1858). 
 8. Id. at 77 
 9. Id. at 79, 82. 
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exceptions), dismissals of officers and cadets in peacetime, and all sentences 
involving general officers. 
The Navy had even less due process.  The tradition of reposing absolute 
authority in the captain of a ship was so strong that no formal review existed at 
all until the Civil War, and then only in capital cases. 
Two controversies, one in each service, focused public attention on the 
systems of military justice and eventually resulted in limited reform, although 
wholesale change had to wait until after World War II. 
The Navy’s controversy was the alleged mutiny on the ship Somers in 1842.10  
The ship was on a cruise intended to train midshipmen who would become naval 
officers.  The captain, Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, heard rumors that one of 
the midshipmen, Philip Spencer, was conspiring with sailors to take over the 
ship and convert her into a pirate.  Mackenzie was no buffoon; he was a cultured 
man who was a distinguished author and naval historian.  One of his brothers 
was later a United States Senator from Louisiana.  Spencer was, to put it mildly, 
a behavior problem, who had been thrown out of colleges and engaged in a 
drunken brawl on another ship.  He was sullen, disobedient, and given to 
fraternizing with the ship’s enlisted men.  Unfortunately for Mackenzie, he was 
also the son of the current Secretary of War, a New York politician named John 
C. Spencer, whose connections had gotten him the naval appointment and kept 
him from being dismissed.  Mackenzie was at first inclined to disregard the 
allegations, but eventually put Spencer and two enlisted men in irons.  Over the 
next few days, matters went from bad to worse; discipline among the crew 
declined and several more men were put in irons, calling into question whether 
the remaining crew could run the ship.  Eventually Mackenzie convened a 
council of the officers of the ship, which heard substantial ex parte testimony 
from members of the crew.  Based on this and on a paper made by Spencer 
written partially in Greek, the council recommended Spencer and two sailors be 
put to death.  Although the ship was only a few days out of the Virgin Islands at 
the time, Mackenzie thought the situation too dangerous to wait and ordered the 
sentence executed. 
There were multiple legal problems with the affair.  Mackenzie had no 
authority to convene a general court-martial, and, even if he had, there were not 
enough senior officers on board the Somers to constitute one.  The accused were 
not afforded even the limited rights then prescribed for naval courts-martial; they 
were not present and could not confront or question the witnesses or other 
evidence against them. 
Needless to say, the news that the Secretary of War’s son had been hanged 
caused a political uproar.  A naval court of inquiry was convened, which 
exonerated Mackenzie; but by that time, he had demanded a court-martial 
                                                 
 10. See Joshua Kastenbeg, A Sesquicentennial Historic Analysis of Dynes v. Hoover and the 
Supreme Court’s Bow to Military Necessity: From its Relationship to Dred Scott v. Sandford to its 
Contemporary Influence, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 595, 609–10 (2009). 
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himself.  He was court-martialed on the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, a 
highly competent Virginian named Abel P. Upshur.  The charges will be familiar 
to the judge advocates here: in addition to murder, they included conduct 
unbecoming and cruelty and maltreatment.  The court-martial eventually found 
the charges “not proved,” though by a divided vote.  The findings went to the 
convening authority, the Secretary, and were considered in a Cabinet meeting 
under President John Tyler.  Secretary Spencer, far from recusing himself, called 
for a second trial.  Secretary Upshur, backed by the President, saw it as an issue 
of double jeopardy.  A fist fight broke out between the two secretaries, which 
Tyler helped quell. 
The immediate legal effect of the affair was modest; when Congress 
overhauled the naval articles in 1862, it included a requirement that capital 
sentences be confirmed by the President.11  The administrative consequences 
were far greater; the affair led directly to the founding of the U.S. Naval 
Academy in 1845, to replace the training of midshipmen at sea.12  Finally, the 
literary consequences must be mentioned.  The first lieutenant on the Somers, 
Gert Gansevoort, who had a distinguished career in the Civil War, was a cousin 
of the author Herman Melville.  It is thought that Melville was inspired to write 
Billy Budd by the affair.  Two other consequences are worthy of mention: 
President Tyler appointed Upshur Secretary of State later in 1843; in that office, 
he was active in the effort to annex the Republic of Texas.  In February 1844, he 
was killed (along with the incumbent Secretary of the Navy) in the explosion of 
a naval gun on board the U.S.S. Princeton, which was conducting a VIP cruise 
on the Potomac River.  President Tyler survived only because he was below 
decks at the time.  So, Upshur, like Philip Spencer, died on a U.S. naval vessel.  
Spencer himself, before his naval career, had briefly been a student at Union 
College, where he was one of the founders of a fraternity, Chi Psi, which exists 
today.  The fraternity immortalized him in a song, the refrain of which proclaims 
that “Humanity received a blow when Philip Spencer died.”13  Humanity may or 
may not have received a blow, but Mackenzie’s naval career certainly did. 
The Army situation, which had far greater immediate legal consequences, was 
the Houston mutiny of August 1917.  The United States had entered World War 
I in April, and the Army was building an installation near Houston.  The 3rd 
Battalion of the 24th Infantry was ordered to proceed from New Mexico, where 
it was doing Mexican border duty (this being the age of Pancho Villa,) to 
Houston to guard the construction site.  The 24th was one of the two black 
                                                 
 11. An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, Pub. L. No. 37-204, 
Art. 19, 12 Stat. 600, 605 (1862). 
 12. Gary A. LaValley, The Record—March 1998, THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY 
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/publications/record/1998/03/us-naval-academy-
archives.html 
 (last visited May 31, 2020). 
 13. W.H. Ross, Jr., Phillip Spencer, CHI PSI FRATERNITY, https://cdn.ymaws.com/ 
www.chipsi.org/resource/resmgr/songbook/philipspencer.pdf. 
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infantry regiments in the rigidly segregated Army.  The commissioned officers 
were white, but all the NCOs and troops were black.  After an encounter with 
the Houston police that resulted in the arrest and beating of two privates and a 
corporal, a group of soldiers took weapons from the camp armory and marched 
on the town.  A violent encounter ensued, which left 20 people dead—four 
soldiers, four policemen, and 12 civilians.  By the next day, order was restored, 
the soldiers were disarmed, and the battalion was sent back to New Mexico.  
Later, the whole regiment was transferred to the Philippines.  The Commander 
of the Southern Department, Major General John Wilson Ruckman, convened at 
Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, the largest mass court-martial in U.S. history, 
with 64 members of the battalion on trial for murder, mutiny, and related 
offenses.  The court-martial panel included three brigadier generals, seven 
colonels, and three lieutenant colonels.  Seven soldiers agreed to testify against 
others in exchange for clemency.  Some two hundred witnesses testified over 22 
days.  There were very significant problems with testimony identifying those 
who took part in the violence, as the night was dark and rainy.  In the end, 
virtually all the accused were convicted (41 received life sentences) and 13 were 
sentenced to death.  While the Articles of War required presidential confirmation 
of capital sentences, there was an exception for convictions of murder, mutiny, 
and certain other offenses in wartime.  The record of trial for each day of the 
court-martial was reviewed and approved that night by the departmental judge 
advocate.  Thus, when the sentences were adjudged and the court-martial 
adjourned, the record of trial was almost immediately ready for action by 
General Ruckman, the convening authority, which was all that was required.  
The 13 men were hanged on 11 December.  A public uproar ensued when the 
news came out, and less than three weeks later a War Department order 
prohibited the execution of any death sentence until it was reviewed in the Judge 
Advocate General’s office.  Shortly after, the War Department suspended all 
death sentences until they could be reviewed by the President.  Two additional 
courts-martial eventually tried 55 more soldiers, six of whom were hanged after 
the President reviewed their cases and approved the sentences.  In 1920, 
Congress amended the Articles of War to require the institution of boards of 
review in the office of the Judge Advocate General.  These boards were not 
courts, but administrative entities that reviewed the records of trial for legal 
sufficiency and clemency.  In World War II, branch boards of review were set 
up in the overseas theaters, which handled thousands of courts-martial.  This 
system survived until 1948, when Congress enacted the Elston Act.  That statute, 
among other reforms, established a Judicial Council made up of three general 
officers and continued the boards of review.  The Judicial Council, while it 
provided a higher level of review, was still within The Judge Advocate General’s 
office and was not a court, nor intended to be one.  The Elston Act was opposed 
by the supporters of a uniform code and service unification because it was single-
service legislation; it passed only by being incorporated into the peacetime draft 
bill that was making its way through Congress at the time.  (A naval version of 
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the Act never went anywhere and the Air Force, after its separation from the 
Army, claimed that the Act did not apply to it.)  In the end, the Elston regime 
only lasted two years.  In 1950, it and the naval articles were replaced by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the regime that, with modifications 
in 1968 and 1983, exists today. 
Until 1950, there was still no direct judicial review of courts-martial, only 
collateral review by habeas corpus.  In the Navy, the tradition of the supremacy 
of the captain at sea was so strong that there were not even boards of review 
until World War II. 
After World War II, during which there were over two million courts-martial, 
80,000 general court-martial convictions, several hundred death sentences, and 
nearly 150 executions, dissatisfaction with the administration of military justice 
resulted in a remarkable (by today’s standards) degree of public consensus that 
change was necessary.  Equally remarkable by today’s standards was the 
willingness of Congress to put in years of effort to fix the problem.  A panel 
headed by Professor Edmund M. Morgan of Harvard drafted a Uniform Code of 
Military Justice to replace both the Articles of War and the Articles for the 
Government of the Navy.  Both Houses of Congress held extensive hearings, 
and in 1950, the Code was signed into law by President Truman. 
One of the novelties of the UCMJ was the institution, for the first time, of 
direct civilian judicial review of courts-martial.  This was not popular with many 
in the services, who felt that it threatened command prerogatives.  (In fact, the 
Elston Act’s Judicial Council, which provided administrative, not judicial, 
review within the Army, was an alternative that many judge advocates favored.) 
In the end, however, the supporters of real judicial review won out, although 
the course of debate was by no means straightforward.  In the House, the name 
“Judicial Council” was dropped because members thought it sounded too much 
like a “city council”; it was replaced by “Court of Military Appeals,” a name 
that dated back to General Samuel Ansell’s suggested reforms after World War 
I.  The Morgan Committee had recommended a provision that authorized each 
of the service secretaries to appoint one judge.  This survived internal 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) review but was objected to by the Bureau of 
the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)), which likely 
pointed out the obvious Appointments Clause problems inherent in the 
provision, and held that the President should do the appointing.  The draft bill 
was so modified and returned to Congress; in the House, Senate confirmation of 
the nominees was added.  The other major issue—one which has raised its head 
from time to time over the years—was the tenure of the judges.  The House 
thought that life tenure was necessary to depoliticize the Court and included it 
in the House bill.  However, in the Senate the thinking was different.  Senator 
Leverett Saltonstall, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, 
and the influential Senator Estes Kefauver thought that life tenure would make 
the Court a dumping ground for political hacks.  Senator Richard Russell, who 
would later chair the Armed Services Committee for almost 15 years, was 
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opposed to life tenure for any judge on any court.  The Senate inserted an eight-
year term in its version of the bill.  The present 15-year term, with initial 
staggering (15, 10, and 5 years) was arrived at in conference with the House.  
There was also some skirmishing over pension and retirement benefits for the 
judges, but that issue was not ultimately resolved until the 1990 amendments to 
the Code. 
So, what do we have? What is the CAAF? 
—Originally a three-member court, known as the U.S. Court of Military 
Appeals.  At the height of service dissatisfaction with the Court around 1960, an 
Army commission recommended a court-packing plan which would have added 
two seats, to be appointed from retired military officers, for four-year terms.  
Although the three-judge size had inherent problems, this effort went nowhere.  
It was not until 1990 that the Court was expanded to its present five members.  
The name was changed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in 
1994, at the same time that the Courts of Military Review (the old boards of 
review) were re-designated as Courts of Criminal Appeals. 
The judges are appointed by the President, with Senate advice and consent, to 
15-year terms.  Originally, the President designated one judge as the chief judge, 
who remained chief until the President, or one of his successors, designated 
someone else.  Thus, Robert Quinn, the original chief judge, served as such for 
almost 20 years until President Nixon designated someone else, and Chief Judge 
Robinson Everett was chief judge for virtually his whole tenure on the Court.  
Now, the chief judge is the senior judge who has not yet served as chief, and he 
serves five years or until his term expires, whichever comes first. 
There is one unique provision on membership: 
No person may be appointed as a judge within seven years after retirement 
from active duty as a regular commissioned officer. 
This provision was obviously intended to emphasize the civilian nature of the 
court, and by extension the principle of civilian control of the armed forces.  The 
Code has always required that the judges be appointed from civilian (formerly 
“civil”) life, but that phrase was undefined until the 1990 amendments to the 
Code.  Indeed, when Judge Brosman was appointed in 1951, he was on active 
duty as an Air Force Reservist—a problem which was solved only by a hasty 
cutting of orders and a search for an appropriate civilian suit at a nearby 
haberdasher’s.  In 1990, a prohibition on the appointment of any person who 
retired from an armed force with more than 20 years’ active service was inserted.  
This was replaced in 2013 by the present language, which tracks the 
requirements for the appointment of the Secretary of Defense. 
The judges receive the same salary and clerk allowance as Article III circuit 
judges.  Each judge is entitled to five chambers staff—normally three law clerks 
and two administrative people, although the individual judges have broad 
discretion in this area. 
The court’s jurisdiction is set out in Article 67, UCMJ.  There are three 
categories: capital cases, in which plenary review is mandatory; cases certified 
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by one of The Judge Advocates General (“TJAGs”), where some action, though 
not necessarily plenary consideration, is required; and petition cases (the great 
majority of them), where review is discretionary.  The court thus works 
internally like the Supreme Court, not the Article III courts of appeals, in that 
much chambers time is spent in reviewing petitions and deciding what cases to 
review.  The court always sits en banc, not in panels. 
Normally, vacancies on the court are quickly filled, with a minimum of 
political fuss. Judge Ohlson’s nomination was an exception, although the delay 
in his confirmation had absolutely nothing to do with his qualifications and 
everything to do with unrelated political issues involving the Justice 
Department.  One of the great advantages to Article I status is that legislative 
jurisdiction over the court and the UCMJ lies with the Armed Services 
Committees of Congress, not the Judiciary Committee.  The court and the Code 
benefit greatly from knowledgeable oversight by members and staff who care 
about these areas of law.  The same is true, in normal times, with respect to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and nominations to the court. 
With that, I will close and take your questions.  I want to commend the staff 
of the Law Review for choosing military justice as the subject for its Symposium.  
The subject and its practitioners can only benefit from this kind of scholarly 
attention.  Too often it is walled off in specialized publications not known to the 
civilian bench and bar, let alone the general public.  Thank you for all the work 
you have put into this endeavor. 
 
